How can a large republic control the effects of faction?

OCR: 1 cited passage(s) are machine-read (OCR) text of old printings; quotations reproduce the stored OCR text, misreadings included.

Reporter's notes: some cited speeches survive only as a reporter's shorthand record, not the speaker's own text.

1. WHAT HE SAID (the record)

Record ledger

• BELIEF (1787-04): James Madison believed that a large republic could control the effects of faction by breaking society into a greater variety of interests, pursuits, and passions, which would check each other. He argued that in a large republic, common interests or passions are less likely to be felt and combinations less easy to form, reducing the risk of factional oppression. "The Society becomes broken into a greater variety of interests, of pursuits, of passions, which check each other, whilst those who may feel a common sentiment have less opportunity of communication and concert." [1]
• BELIEF (1787-04): James Madison believed that a large republic can control the effects of faction by meliorating the administration through an extensive republic and by ensuring a process of elections that extracts the purest and noblest characters from society. "As a limited Monarchy tempers the evils of an absolute one; so an extensive Republic meliorates the administration of a small Republic." [2]
• BELIEF (1787-06-06; reporter's paraphrase): James Madison believed that a large republic could control the effects of faction by enlarging the sphere of government as far as its nature would admit. He argued that this would prevent the majority from uniting under a common interest or passion to endanger the rights of the minority. "It was to be inferred then that wherever these prevailed the State was too small...This was the only defence agst. the inconveniences of democracy consistent with the democratic form of Govt." [3]
• BELIEF (1787-06-07; reporter's paraphrase): James Madison believed that a large number of members in a body like the Senate would lead to the vices they are meant to correct, based on the example of Roman Tribunes. He argued that as the number of representatives increases, their influence and power decrease, making them less capable of fulfilling their trust. (key quote above) [4]
• BELIEF (1787-10-24): James Madison believed that in an extended republic like the United States, the general government would hold a balance between the parties of particular states and be restrained by its dependence on the community, preventing it from betraying general interests. This belief is grounded in his argument that an extended republic can neutralize factional effects. (key quote above) [5]
• BELIEF (1787-11-30): James Madison believed that a large republic could control the effects of faction by extending the sphere of the government, which would allow for a greater diversity of parties and interests, making it less likely that a majority faction could dominate. He argued that in a republic, where representatives govern, the system is not limited to a small area like a democracy. (key quote above) [6]
• BELIEF (undated): James Madison argues that a large republic can control the effects of faction by having a more effective system of representation, a greater variety of parties preventing any one from dominating, and greater obstacles to the coordination of an unjust majority. These factors make it less likely for factional interests to spread widely and influence national councils. "The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States." [7]
• BELIEF (undated): James Madison believed that a large republic could control the effects of faction by tempering popular government with general authority and laws of the confederacy, as seen in the example of the Achaean republic. He argued that this structure reduced violence and sedition compared to individual sovereign cities. "BECAUSE IT WAS THERE TEMPERED BY THE GENERAL AUTHORITY AND LAWS OF THE CONFEDERACY." [8]
• BELIEF (undated): James Madison believed that a large republic can control the effects of faction by either preventing the same passion or interest from existing in a majority at the same time, or by making the majority, despite having such coexistent passion or interest, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression due to their number and local situation. "By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression." [9]
• BELIEF (1788-02-08): James Madison argued that in an extended republic with a great variety of interests, parties, and sects, a coalition of a majority of the whole society would seldom take place on principles other than justice and the general good. He believed that the larger the society, provided it lies within a practical sphere, the more capable it will be of self-government. "In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good;" [10]

What cuts against it

• ACTION (1829-09-01): James Madison believed that the only effective safeguard against the majority's potential to abuse power in a republic is a government structure that protects the rights of the minority. However, he also acknowledged the limitations of human nature, including the tendency for conscience to be deluded. "The only effectual safeguard to the rights of the minority must be laid in such a basis and structure of the Government itself as may afford," [11]

2. HOW IT APPLIES (reasoning; inference is marked)

1. James Madison believed that a large republic could control the effects of faction by breaking society into a greater variety of interests, pursuits, and passions, which would check each other. [1]

2. He argued that in a large republic, common interests or passions are less likely to be felt and combinations less easy to form, reducing the risk of factional oppression. [1]

3. Madison also believed that an extended republic could neutralize factional effects by holding a balance between the parties of particular states and being restrained by its dependence on the community. [5]

4. He argued that in an extended republic with a great variety of interests, parties, and sects, a coalition of a majority of the whole society would seldom take place on principles other than justice and the general good. [10]

5. Madison believed that the larger the society, provided it lies within a practical sphere, the more capable it will be of self-government. [10]

3. HIS TAKE

Record coverage: DIRECT

Extrapolation: James Madison directly addressed the question of how a large republic can control the effects of faction. He argued that a large republic could control the effects of faction by breaking society into a greater variety of interests, pursuits, and passions, which would check each other. He also believed that an extended republic could neutralize factional effects by holding a balance between the parties of particular states and being restrained by its dependence on the community. Additionally, he argued that in an extended republic with a great variety of interests, parties, and sects, a coalition of a majority of the whole society would seldom take place on principles other than justice and the general good.

Competing readings: There is a competing reading that increasing the number of members in a body like the Senate could lead to the vices they are meant to correct, based on the example of Roman Tribunes. [4] This reading is supported by the record itself.

Confidence: High, as the record directly addresses the question and provides multiple arguments for how a large republic can control the effects of faction.