What is the origin of the right to punish?

Translation: quotations from Cesare Beccaria are quoted in the anonymous 1767 English translation (London; Albany 1872 edition), not his original words.

1. WHAT HE SAID (the record)

Record ledger

• BELIEF (undated; quoted in the anonymous 1767 English translation (London; Albany 1872 edition)): Cesare Beccaria argues that the right to punish is not based on any pretended obligation or ancient convention, which he deems null and unjust. He believes the authority of the laws is not derived from such sources, but rather from an existing society or its sovereign representative. [1]
• BELIEF (undated; quoted in the anonymous 1767 English translation (London; Albany 1872 edition)): Cesare Beccaria believed that the right to punish comes from the idea of public utility, which arises from the opposition of private passions and interests, and not from the degree of sin or divine justice. "Necessity alone hath produced, from the opposition of private passions and interests, the idea of public utility, which is the foundation of human justice." [2]
• BELIEF (undated; quoted in the anonymous 1767 English translation (London; Albany 1872 edition)): Cesare Beccaria believed that the right to punish is founded on the necessity of defending public liberty from the usurpation of individuals. He argued that punishments are just in proportion as the liberty preserved by the sovereign is sacred and valuable. [3]
• BELIEF (undated; quoted in the anonymous 1767 English translation (London; Albany 1872 edition)): Cesare Beccaria believed that the origin of the right to punish lies in the necessity of defending public liberty from the usurpation of individuals. He argued that punishments are just in proportion as the liberty preserved by the sovereign is sacred and valuable. "It is upon this, then, that the sovereign's right to punish crimes is founded; that is, upon the necessity of defending the public liberty, intrusted to his care, from the usurpation of individuals; and punishments are just in proportion as the liberty, preserved by the sovereign, is sacred and valuable." [4]
• BELIEF (undated; quoted in the anonymous 1767 English translation (London; Albany 1872 edition)): Cesare Beccaria believed that the right to punish does not include the right to take away life, and that the laws represent the general will, which is the aggregate of the private liberty of each individual. He argued that no one ever gave others the right to take away their life, and that the punishment of death is not authorized by any right. "The laws, as I have said before, are only the sum of the smallest portions of the private liberty of each individual, and represent the general will, which is the aggregate of that of each individual. Did any one ever give to others the right of taking away his life?" [5]
• BELIEF (undated; quoted in the anonymous 1767 English translation (London; Albany 1872 edition)): Cesare Beccaria believed that society can only take away a citizen's public protection after it has been proved that he has violated the conditions on which it was granted. He argues that no man can be judged a criminal until he is found guilty, and that the right to punish cannot be based on power alone when there remains any doubt of guilt. "No man can be judged a criminal until he be found guilty; nor can society take from him the public protection, until it have been proved that he has violated the conditions on which it was granted." [6]
• BELIEF (undated; quoted in the anonymous 1767 English translation (London; Albany 1872 edition)): Cesare Beccaria believed that the right to punish arises from the necessity of punishing an individual for the general good, and that this necessity exists only in the place where the crime was committed. He argued that punishment is not a universal right but is tied to the social compact and the laws of the society where the crime occurred. (key quote above) [7]
• BELIEF (undated; quoted in the anonymous 1767 English translation (London; Albany 1872 edition)): Cesare Beccaria believed that the right to punish originates from the laws, which are determined by the legislator representing the whole society through the social compact. He argued that no magistrate can justly inflict punishment not ordained by the laws. "The laws only can determine the punishment of crimes; and the authority of making penal laws can only reside with the legislator, who represents the whole society united by the social compact." [8]

What cuts against it

• The contrary-evidence entries are already in the record ledger above: [1], [2].

2. HOW IT APPLIES (reasoning; inference is marked)

1. Cesare Beccaria believed the right to punish is not derived from divine justice or ancient conventions, but from necessity and public utility. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [1] [2]

2. He argued that the right to punish is founded on the necessity of defending public liberty from the usurpation of individuals. [3] [4]

3. The right to punish is not based on the idea of divine justice or the degree of sin, but on the necessity of preserving the social compact and the general will. [5] [2]

4. The laws, representing the general will, are the only legitimate source of punishment, and no magistrate can justly inflict punishment not ordained by the laws. [8]

5. The necessity of punishing an individual for the general good is tied to the place where the crime was committed, not to a universal or divine right. [7] (inference)

3. HIS TAKE

Record coverage: DIRECT

Extrapolation: Cesare Beccaria believed the origin of the right to punish is in the necessity of preserving public liberty and the social compact, not in divine justice or ancient conventions. He argued that the right to punish is derived from the laws, which represent the general will of society.

Competing readings: One reading is that the right to punish is based on necessity and public utility, as stated in the passages. Another reading is that the right to punish is not based on any pretended obligation or ancient convention, but rather from an existing society or its sovereign representative. [1]

Confidence: High, as the record directly addresses the question and provides clear statements on the origin of the right to punish.